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ABSTRACT
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedi-
cated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve
specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions,
especially continuous double auctions, makes it difficult to
apply the usual analytic game-theoretic methods to do this.
This paper takes an experimental approach, searching a pa-
rameterized space of possible auction types, and presents
a new pricing policy for continuous double auctions. The
paper further demonstrates how this policy, together with
a shout improvement rule, helps to reduce the fluctuation
of transaction prices in auctions involving agents with min-
imum intelligence while keeping the overall efficiency high.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial In-
telligence—Multiagent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, design, economics, experimentation, measure-
ment, performance
Keywords
Continuous double auction, pricing policy, shout improve-
ment rule
1. INTRODUCTION
Auctions, as a subclass of markets, have been widely used
in solving real-world resource allocation problems, and in
structuring stock or futures exchanges. This is due to the
fact that auctions, when well designed [9], achieve desired
economic outcomes like high allocative efficiency. Auctions
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are also an excellent scenario in which to study the dynam-
ics and characteristics of micro-economics and they play an
important role in computer-based control systems [2].
Research on auctions originally interested economists and
mathematicians. They view auctions as games and have
successfully applied traditional analytic methods from game
theory to some kinds of auctions [11], for example the second-
price sealed-bid auctions or Vickrey auctions [23]. The high
complexity of the dynamics of some other auction types, es-
pecially double-sided auctions [5] or das1, however makes it
difficult to go further in this direction [10, 20, 25].
As a result, researchers turned to experimental approaches.
Starting in 1955, Smith pioneered the experimental approach
[21] conducting auctions involving human traders that re-
vealed many of the properties of double auctions. For ex-
ample, his work showed that in continuous double auctions
or cdas
2
, even a handful of traders can lead to high over-
all efficiency, and transaction prices can quickly converge to
the theoretical equilibrium. Smith’s focus was mainly on
the convergence of transaction prices in different scenarios
rather than examining why high efficiency is obtained—this
is the same topic that interests us. In a computerized world,
a question that arises naturally is whether these results can
be replicated in electronic auctions. In Smith’s experiments,
as in real markets traditionally, the traders are human be-
ings, but computer programs are supposed to be automatic
and work without human involvement. Obviously humans
are intelligent creatures, but programs are not, at least for
the foreseeable future. Is it intelligence that contributes to
the high efficiency, or something else?
Gode and Sunder [7, 8] were among the first to address
this question, claiming that no intelligence is necessary for
the goal of achieving high efficiency; so the outcome is due to
the auction mechanism itself. They introduced two trading
strategies: zero intelligence without constraint (zi-u) and
zero intelligence with constraint (zi-c), and showed that zi-
u, the more näıve version, which shouts an offer at a random
price without considering whether it is losing money or not,
performs poorly. In contrast, zi-c — which lacks the moti-
vation of maximizing profit just like zi-u, but guarantees no
1
In das, both competing sellers and buyers can make offers, in con-
trast to the most common auction mechanisms, such as the English
auction, where only buyers bid.
2
A cda is a continuous da in which any trader can accept an offer
and make a deal any time during the auction period.
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loss — generates high efficiency solutions [7] and provides
a lower bound on the efficiency of markets [8]. These re-
sults were however questioned by Cliff and Bruten [2], who
thought Gode and Sunder’s conclusion was not convincing
because the scenarios considered were not as comprehensive
as in Smith’s experiments, and showed [2] that in differ-
ent scenarios the zi-c agents performed poorly, especially in
terms of convergence to the theoretical equilibrium.
Cliff and Bruten further designed an adaptive trading
strategy called zero intelligence plus or zip, and showed zip
worked better than zi-c, generating high efficiency outcomes
and converging to the equilibrium price. This led Cliff and
Bruten to suggest that zip embodied the minimum intel-
ligence required by traders. Subsequent work has led to
the development of further trading strategies, including that
proposed by Roth and Erev [18], which we call re, and that
suggested by Gjerstad and Dickhaut [6], commonly referred
to as gd.
This work on trading strategies is only one facet of the re-
search on auctions. Gode and Sunder’s results suggest that
auction mechanisms play an important role in determining
the outcome of an auction, and this is further bourne out
by the work of Walsh et al. [25] (which also points out that
results hinge on both auction design and the mix of trad-
ing strategies used). For example, if an auction is strategy-
proof, traders need not bother to conceal their private val-
ues and in such auctions complex trading agents are not
required. While typical double auctions are not strategy-
proof, McAfee [12] has derived a form of double auction
that is strategy-proof (though this strategy-proofness comes
at the cost of lower efficiency).
The work described here differs from the bulk of the lit-
erature. It differs because that bulk of work considers the
design of trading strategies, looking for approaches that can
achieve high efficiency [6, 17] or high profit [19, 22]. In
contrast, we follow the work of Phelps et al. in looking to
optimize several metrics — price fluctuation and efficiency
— by manipulating the design of the auction itself, and we
aim to do this, as Walia et al. [24] do, for populations of zi-c
agents. In particular, this paper presents some preliminary
experimental results in designing auction mechanisms, show-
ing how a new pricing policy and a new shout improvement
rule can augment a traditional continuous double auction
involving zero intelligence agents to reduce the fluctuation
of transaction prices, while keeping overall efficiency high.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
recent related work in auction mechanism design. Section
3 introduces our new pricing policy and shout improvement
rule, and describes the experimentation work and results.
We follow that with a discussion of our results in Section 4
and conclude with a brief summary in Section 5.
2. AUCTION DESIGN
Mechanism design applied to auctions explores how to
design the rules that govern auctions to obtain specific goals.
2.1 Auction types
Generally an auction involves buyers and sellers who aim
to exchange commodities at agreed prices. The most com-
mon auction form is English auction, in which there is a
single seller, and multiple buyers compete by making in-
creasing bids for the commodity — the one who offers the
highest price wins the right to purchase the good being auc-
tioned. Since only one type of trader makes offers in an
English auction, it belongs to the class of single-sided auc-
tions. Accordingly, there are double-sided auctions or das,
in which both sellers and buyers make shouts3 . Two most
common forms of das are clearing house or ch and contin-
uous double auction or cda. In a ch, an auctioneer collects
bids — shouts made by buyers — and asks — shouts made
by sellers; the market-clearing (or equilibrium) price is then
determined by maximizing the number of transactions and
guaranteeing that if a trader is involved in a transaction,
those with more competitive offers are also involved; and
the market finally clears at that price. In a cda, a trader
can make a shout and accept an offer from someone at any
time, which makes a cda able to process many transactions
in a short time. Both kinds of double auction are of prac-
tical importance as well, with, for example, cda variants
being widely used in real-world stock or trading markets in-
cluding the New York Stock Exchange (nyse) and Chicago
Mercantile Exchange.
One can think of different forms of auctions as varying
according to certain aspects of the auction rules, forming a
parameterized auction space. For example, Wurman et. al.
[27] parameterized auction rules using the following classifi-
cation:
• Bidding rules: How many sellers and buyers are there?
Are both groups allowed to make shouts? How is a
shout expressed? Does a shout have to beat the cor-
responding market quote if one exists?
• Information revelation: When and what market quotes
are generated and announced? Are shouts visible to
all traders?
• Clearing policy: When does clearing a market take
place? When does a market close? How are crossing
shouts matched? How is a transaction price deter-
mined?
2.2 Performance metrics
Auctions with different values for the parameters described
above may vary greatly in performance. Popular perfor-
mance measurements include, but are not limited to, alloca-
tive efficiency and Smith’s coefficient of convergence α.
The allocative efficiency, Ea, of an auction is used to mea-
sure how much social welfare is obtained through an auction.




|vi − pi| (1)
where pi is the price of a trade made by agent i and vi is
the private value of agent i for all agents who trade. The




|vi − p0| (2)
for all agents whose private value is no less competitive than
the equilibrium price, where p0 is the equilibrium price, the
price at which, if all agents bid their private value, supply






Another term for offers made by traders.
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Figure 1: Typical values of Ea for CDA markets
populated with common trading strategies














Figure 2: The supply and demand schedules
By way of indicating typical efficiencies achieved in a cda,
Figure 1 shows the trend of the overall efficiencies of ho-
mogeneous cdas lasting 10 days with 50 rounds per day
4
in which 10 buyers and 10 sellers all use the same strat-




, zip, re, and gd. The results
are averaged over 400 iterations and obtained in jasa—an
extensible Java-based auction simulation environment [13].
The convergence coefficient, α, was introduced by Smith
[21] to measure how far an active auction is away from the
equilibrium point. It actually measures the deviation of













(pi − p0)2 (4)
2.3 Auction design and performance
It is not yet clear how auction design, and thus the choice
of parameter values, contributes to observed performance.
Thus it is not possible to determine how to create an auc-
tion with a particular specification. It is possible to de-
sign simple mechanisms in a provably correct manner from
a specification, as shown by Conitzer and Sandholm [3, 4].
However it is not obvious that this kind of approach can be
extended to mechanisms as complex as double auctions. As
a result, it seems that we will have to design double auc-
tion mechanisms experimentally, at least for the foreseeable
future.
Of course, doing things experimentally does not solve the
general problem. A typical experimental approach is to fix
all but one parameter, creating a one-dimensional space, and
then measure performance across a number of discrete sam-
ple points in the space, obtaining a fitness landscape that
is expected to show how the factor in question correlates to
a certain type of performance and how the auction can be
optimized by tweaking the value of that factor [16]. In other
4
In an experimental environment, an auction typically includes a spe-
cific number of days (called periods in some of the literature), and
each day in turn consists of a number of consecutive rounds. At
the beginning of each day, traders are initialized and the auction be-
gins/resumes running until the day ends. Days in an auction are
totally isolated from each other except that knowledge obtained by
traders over the previous days may remain. The division of days helps
to identify the change of performance caused by the adaptive behavior
of traders with the accumulation of knowledge over time.
5
tt denotes the Truth-telling strategy, in which agents truthfully re-
port their private values.
6
“Kaplan” refers to Todd Kaplan’s sniping strategy, in which agents
wait until the last minute before attempting to steal the deal [19].
words, the experimental approach examines one small part
of a mechanism and tries to optimize that part
7
. The situ-
ation is complicated when more than one factor needs to be
taken into consideration — the search space then becomes
complex and multiple dimensional, and the computation re-
quired to map and search it quickly becomes prohibitive.
Instead of manual search, some researchers have used evolu-
tionary computation to automate mechanism design in these
situations.
For example, Cliff [1] explored a continuous space of auc-
tion mechanisms by varying the probability of the next shout
(at any point in time) being made by a seller, denoted by
Qs. The continuum includes the cda (Qs = 0.5) and also
two purely single-sided mechanisms that are similar to the
English auction (Qs = 0.0) and the Dutch flower auction
(Qs = 1.0). Cliff’s experiments used genetic algorithms and
found that a Qs that corresponds to a completely new kind
of auction led to a better α value than that obtained for
other auctions when all traders used the zip strategy. Walia,
Byde and Cliff [24] continued with this work, showing that
the new “irregular” mechanism can lead to high efficiency in
zi-c markets as well. Taking another tack, Phelps et al. [14,
16] demonstrated how genetic programming can be used to
find an optimal point in a space of pricing policies, where
the notion of optimality is based on efficiency and trader
market power, and transaction prices are determined from
matching bids and asks and market quotes.
In this paper we make some preliminary steps towards an
evolutionary computation analysis that extends the work
of [24]. In particular, we demonstrate that a new policy for
setting transaction prices and a new shout improvement rule
are capable of lowering the fluctuations in transaction price
while keeping efficiency high. Both these new mechanisms
are parameterized, and so the space of all such mechanisms
can be searched using evolutionary techniques.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We start by looking at the impact of a new pricing policy
and then go on to look at a shout improvement rule.
3.1 A new pricing policy
A pricing policy defines how transaction prices are deter-
mined from the offers made by traders. In traditional cdas,
a typical pricing policy sets the price in the middle of the
7
And of course there are rarely any guarantees as to the optimality
of the results.
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matching ask-bid pair using the following expression with
k = 0.5
p = k · pa + (1− k) · pb (5)
where pa and pb are prices offered respectively by the seller
and the buyer. This is the usual k-double auction pric-
ing rule [20], which is clearly a discriminatory policy
8
, and
which we denote as the kpricingpolicy hereafter. In contrast
to this, chs usually adopt a non-discriminatory or uniform
pricing policy. Phelps et al. [16] have shown that k = 0.5
is the best value to use when optimizing a combination of
allocative efficiency and trader market power
9
.
Determining the transaction price merely by the corre-
sponding bid and ask, however, may be problematic. In a
cda with zi-c traders using the kpricingpolicy (denoted as
kcda-zic hereafter), the transaction prices fluctuate wildly
as shown in Figure 3(a). This result, which is due to the
randomness with which zi-c makes offers, is seen in Gode
and Sunder’s results [7]. In contrast, in markets involving
more complex trading strategies like gd, the phenomenon is
less obvious. Figure 3(d) shows the same measurements as
Figure 3(a) but for all-gd traders (a setup called kcda-gd
hereafter).
The above results are obtained by running kcda-zic and
kcda-gd in jasa with similar settings to the auctions that
gave rise to Figure 1. Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(d) show the
first 10 iterations, each with a different random seed, de-
tailing the dynamic characteristics of the transaction prices
set in these auctions. It is important to note that this is
10 separate runs over 10 days, with each run starting from
scratch. If we did not start over from scratch at the end of
each 10 days of trading, the prices for gd would fluctuate
even less because there would be no “start of run” varia-
tion. The supply and demand schedules are fixed for all the
iterations and those in Figure 2.
There are several reasons why we consider it worth study-
ing the fluctuation in transaction prices in markets popu-
lated by zi-c traders. First, as Walia et al. [24] argue, auc-
tion mechanisms that do well with zi-c are likely to be “ro-
bust to trader-irrationality”, in other words they are mar-
kets that will work reliably well. Second, markets in which
one can trade with minimal intelligence and still have good
performance are nearly as good as markets that are strategy-
proof — traders are free from some of the burden of having
to make good offers. Finally, reducing fluctuation is good
for participants in the market — participants in a low fluc-
tuation market are guaranteed not to be given a transac-
tion price too far from the equilibrium, and this may mean
traders are more likely to use this kind of market than an-
other with higher fluctuations.
To reduce the fluctuation, we used a new pricing policy
that we call the npricingpolicy. This keeps a sliding window
of matching ask-bid pairs and uses the average price of those
shouts to set the transaction price. If n is the window length
and t the number of matching ask-bid pairs at a given point
in time, then the transaction price for the tth transaction is
8
Meaning it varies from trade to trade.
9
[16] does not just search through possible values of k. Instead it
searches through all possible arithmetic combinations of shout prices
and market quotes, evolving a horribly complex expression which is








(pai + pbi) (6)
where pai and pbi are the ask and bid prices corresponding to
the ith transaction respectively. The npricingpolicy general-
izes the usual k-double auction pricing policy (kpricingpolicy)
since when n = 1, it becomes the kpricingpolicy with k =
0.5, and when n is the number of matching ask-bid pairs in
the entire auction, the npricingpolicy is the rule commonly
used to set prices in a ch
10
.
We replaced the kpricingpolicy with the npricingpolicy,
n = 4, in the same auctions as before, giving ncda-zic and
ncda-gd respectively. Figures 3(b) shows that the price
fluctuation is reduced for zi-c markets, but is still higher
than that of kcda-gd
11
. This qualitative conclusion is sup-
ported by the quantitative data provided by measuring α for
the different markets. The means and standard deviations
of α and Ea in cda-zics are plotted in Figures 4(a)–4(b),
and Table 1 gives the numeric values of α and Ea over the
full 10 day run of these markets. Averages and standard
deviations are those obtained from 400 iterations of each 10
day run.
The values from Table 1 tell us α = 12.2 for the ncda-
zic. This value plus twice its standard deviation (1.5) is less
than α = 15.6 for the kcda-zic. Since the 95% confidence
interval is two standard deviations around the mean, we can
conclude that the npricingpolicy significantly reduces α in
zi-c markets. By the same calculation, the improvement
of α in the ncda-gd is not significant (it is less than one
standard deviation).
We note that the npricingpolicy merely sets transaction
prices differently, which affects the distribution of profit
across the traders but not the overall efficiency. This is
confirmed by the fact that the Eas of the ncda-zic and
ncda-gd are identical to their kcda counterparts as shown
in Figure 4(b), where the values are superimposed on each
other, and Table 1.
Overall, then, we can conclude for now that the ncda
is significantly better than the traditional cda in terms of
α when populated by zi-c agents and no worse in terms
of efficiency. The results for gd agents suggest that ncda
is robust against different types of trading strategies. To
confirm this we need to assess its performance with other
trading strategies.
3.2 Shout improvement rule
Though the npricingpolicy does well in reducing fluctu-
ation of transaction prices in the kcda-zics, the difference
between α = 12.2 for the ncda-zic vs. α = 4.0 for the
ncda-gd in Table 1 tells us that there may still be space
to improve the performance of markets with zi-c traders.
Why do we still get the obvious fluctuation of transaction
prices in Figure 3(b) even when we use the npricingpolicy?
The answer is that the random selection of offers by zi-c
causes some variation even though the npricingpolicy does
its best to smooth out prices. This variation is less than that
10
Thus n makes a continuum of auction spaces with cda and ch at
either end, and exploring other points in this space is a subject of our
current work.
11
The result for ncda-gd is similar to that for kcda-gd in Figure 3(d),
so omitted here.
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Figure 3: Transaction price curves
Auction α Ea
Type mean stdev mean stdev
kcda-zic 15.613 1.352 95.732 1.537
ncda-zic 12.180 1.532 95.732 1.537
kcdaee-zic 9.360 1.039 93.296 2.061
ncdaee-zic 6.028 1.353 93.788 1.938
ncdaeed5-zic 6.221 1.300 96.072 1.657
ncdaeed10-zic 6.879 1.117 96.868 1.187
ncdaeed15-zic 8.000 1.017 96.864 1.179
ncdaeed20-zic 9.220 1.002 96.744 1.144
Auction α Ea
Type mean stdev mean stdev
kcda-gd 4.198 1.140 99.224 0.548
ncda-gd 4.000 1.1221 99.224 0.548
kcdaee-gd 5.374 4.909 84.612 26.165
ncdaee-gd 5.271 5.245 83.460 26.783
ncdaeed5-gd 4.242 2.779 95.996 13.126
ncdaeed10-gd 4.054 1.262 98.768 1.092
ncdaeed15-gd 4.016 1.256 99.132 0.684
ncdaeed20-gd 3.994 1.217 99.224 0.548
Table 1: Metrics for kCDAs, nCDAs, and nCDAEEs measured over all 10 days of the auctions. Bold face
indicates the corresponding market outperforms or equals its traditional kCDA counterpart. Bold italic
points out the best result in the corresponding ZI-C or GD market group.
when we do not smooth prices, but more than that typically
generated by gd.





(pat , pbt ) to be two consecutive matching ask-bid pairs. If





[pat , pbt ] — will likely be close if not overlapping since gd
makes shouts that are close to previous shouts. This is not
true for zi-c agents for which pat and pbt are selected ran-
domly and independently. Thus for zi-c agents, [pat , pbt ]





If this is the case, the transaction price, pt, determined by
(6) may fall outside of the spread and the transaction price
is selected to be the closest boundary of [pat , pbt ] to pt to
make sure neither agents will make a loss.
Whichever of pat and pbt is used in this case, it will be









] for the same reason, we will get
two transaction prices pt and pt−1 that are not near to
each other. If the auction mechanism forces zi-c agents to
“adapt” their shouts, then the fluctuation might be avoided.
Our approach is to use a shout improvement rule that
forces buyers to bid above a running estimate of the equilib-
rium price, and sellers to ask below it. Thus any matching
ask-bid pair must reside on the respective side of the esti-
mate. When we use the npricingpolicy, the price that is set
will not vary far from the previous transaction price. If the
estimate changes smoothly and converges to the equilibrium




More specifically, the shout improvement rule works in
a way that is similar to the npricingpolicy, maintaining a
sliding window over a series of m transaction prices and









where pi is the transaction price obtained at the time i (de-
12
Interestingly, we designed the shout improvement rule originally to
improve the overall efficiency, since if the estimate is totally accurate
(though this is impossible with incomplete knowledge), the efficiency
can be guaranteed to be 100.
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termined by (6) for the npricingpolicy). Now, at the begin-
ning of auctions, the transaction prices may deviate greatly
from the equilibrium price, and so the rule may cut off those
shouts that are actually on the right side of the equilibrium
price. As a result, we introduce an additional parameter, δ,
to relax the restriction. All bids above pe − δ and all asks
below pe + δ are permitted.
Note that this shout improvement rule is very different
from the common “nyse rule” that forces subsequent offers
to be improvements on one another. That rule applies to
offers for the same good, and so the value is “reset” by a
match between bid and ask. Our rule, in contrast, maintains
continuity between the offers made for successive goods (and
so, as discussed later, we eventually need to consider its
response to price shocks).
We call the auction mechanism obtained by adding the
shout improvement rule cda with Estimated Equilibrium or
cdaee. We replace cda with cdaee with n = 4 and δ = 0 in
the 4 experiments described in the previous section and get
markets we call kcdaee-zic, ncdaee-zic, kcdaee-gd, and
ncdaee-gd. The results of the 2 zi-c markets are plotted
in Figures 4(c)-4(d) and all numeric values are presented in
Table 1. Figure 3(c) demonstrates the dynamic transaction
price curve in ncdaee-zic.
Clearly our results show average α is lower for ncdaee-
zic (6.0) than for ncda-zic (12.2) and the difference is even
more significant than between ncda-zic and kcda-zic (the
95% confidence intervals do not overlap), but average Ea for
ncdaee-zic is slightly lower than for ncda-zic. Worse re-
sults are observed in ncdaee-gd, where average α increases
and average Ea is down.
One reason for this may be that gd agents adapt their
shouts gradually even if their previous shouts were on the
wrong side of the estimated equilibrium price and got re-
jected. Within the limited amount of time as the auctions
last, gd agents may not be able to adapt themselves enough
to make transactions, which leads to low efficiency.
This indicates that it may be beneficial to relax the shout
improvement rule a little and we do this using different posi-
tive values of δ—5, 10, 15, 20—in ncdaee markets, getting 4
new auction mechanisms denoted as ncdaeed5, ncdaeed10,
ncdaeed15, and ncdaeed20. We ran these mechanisms us-
ing zi-c and gd agents respectively and the results are shown
in Figures 4(e)-4(f)
13
, and Table 1.
The ncdaee markets with δ ≥ 5 seem to avoid the low effi-
ciency in the ncdaees with δ = 0 and the kcdaees. Table 1
shows that the ncdaeed5, 10, 15, 20-zic markets perform
better than the ncda-zic, and the ncdaeed20-gd performs
no worse than the ncda-gd in terms of both α and Ea.
Though only the improvement on α in markets using zi-c
traders is close to being statistically significant — obtaining
low α in the zi-c markets is our major goal in this paper —
we believe that these results show that the shout improve-
ment rule has the potential to augment the improvements
demonstrated by the npricingpolicy.
3.3 Evolving DAs using genetic algorithms
The above manual parameter tweaking is obviously not
an ideal method for auction design. Our ultimate goal is to
automate the process. As the first step in this direction, we
conducted a series of experiments by encoding various auc-
13
Only zi-c markets are shown, again to save space, and standard
deviations were omitted from these figures to make them cleaner.
tion parameters into a binary vector of 24 bits and evolving
a population of 100 da individuals, each associated with a
randomly generated vector at the very beginning.
Each vector specifies (1) what policy is used to deter-
mine transaction prices, kpricingpolicy or npricingpolicy, (2)
what rule is used to regulate shout improvement, the nyse
rule, the cdaee rule using sliding window mechanism as in
Section 3.2, or the cdaee rule using the Widrow-Hoff learn-
ing algorithm
14
[26] to adapt the equilibrium price estimate,
and (3) when to clear the market, or, in particular, a proba-
bility τ ∈ [0, 1] with which the market clears whenever a new
shout arrives. The search space is thus multi-dimensional,
and includes points corresponding to the usual cda (τ = 1),
ch (τ = 0), and all the other auction mechanisms discussed
above. This enables us to optimize auction mechanisms au-
tomatically by searching the space.
We first experimented up to 100 generations with mini-
mizing α as the goal15 and all da individuals were evalu-
ated in the same setting as before using homogeneous zi-
c traders. The results showed that the cdaee shout im-
provement rule with the sliding window mechanism not only
dominated the other choices across the whole population
over generations but also appeared in the fittest mechanism
individual found during evolution. This fittest individual
takes 0 for δ, which is consistent with the trend exhibited
by the ncdaeed*-zic markets in Table 1, where ncdaee-
zic, or ncdaeed0-zic, has the lowest average α (4.0). We
also tested with maximizing Ea as the goal and found that
a similar shout improvement rule prevailed with δ = 12.
This result is also confirmative since Table 1 shows that
ncdaeed10-zic has the highest average Ea among ncdaeed*-
zic markets.
Besides δ, the evolutionary experiments identified the val-
ues of other parameters for the fittest auction mechanisms
as well. For example in the case of Ea defined as fitness,
τ = 0.69 was found to be optimal. This is unexpected since
a ch is more efficient than a cda with the same setup and
intuitively clearing a market less frequently helps avoid less
competitive shouts being involved in transactions. We leave
this issue and others as our future work.
4. DISCUSSION
The main result of this paper, then, is that we have iden-
tified a new variation on the double auction, a continuous
double auction with a new pricing policy and a new shout
improvement rule, in which zero intelligence agents can per-
form well. As Walia et al. argue, that we get high efficiency
and low α even for zi-c agents, agents that are on the border-
line between rational and irrational trading behavior, sug-
gests that the new auction is pretty robust.
However, there is more we can do to test the robustness
of this auction. For a start, we need to run further itera-
tions of the existing experiments to identify the significance
or otherwise of the improvements due to the shout improve-
ment rule on top of the new pricing policy. We also need
to examine how the new auction performs on other perfor-
mance metrics and when using trading strategies other than
zi-c and gd, and we are currently running experiments with
the other trading strategies in jasa, namely zip, Kaplan, re,
14
the Widrow-Hoff learning algorithm is used in the zip and pvt strate-
gies to calculate the target price towards which the shout price should
move.
15
The fitness function is F = 100 − α.
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(a) α in CDA-ZICs




















(b) Ea in CDA-ZICs















(c) α in CDAEE-ZICs



















(d) Ea in CDAEE-ZICs
















(e) α in CDAEE-ZICs with non-
zero δ























(f) Ea in CDAEE-ZICs with non-
zero δ
Figure 4: Values of α and Ea for ZI-C markets, (a)-(c) with standard deviations, the values in (b) are so close
that the points are superimposed on one another.
and pvt, the strategy introduced by Preist and van Tol [17].
If these tests show the mechanism to be worthwhile, we will
continue with a heuristic strategy analysis of the kind intro-
duced by Walsh et al. [25], using it as in [15] to evaluate the
expected profit generated by the auction when traders are
free to choose trading strategy.
Finally, we need to examine whether there are negative
aspects of the new auction other than those already identi-
fied for some parameter settings. We note that the windows
used to determine transaction price and to enforce shout im-
provement are similar to the history used by gd to set its
offers. Experiments with gd [6] show that, as one would ex-
pect, increasing the window length slows convergence. This
can be problematic when the market suffers price shocks
— external events that alter agents’ private values. This
is not a scenario much considered in the literature, where
traders are usually optimized for long term profit and effi-
ciency rather than transient behavior (gd being an excep-
tion), but it seems important that the market itself be able
to respond swiftly to external pressures, and response to
price shocks is something we need to investigate in detail.
5. SUMMARY
This paper has described some experiments in mechanism
design for auctions. As a first step towards new work on au-
tomated mechanism design, we have explored by hand some
aspects of the continuous double auction. In particular, we
looked at setting the transaction price by averaging over n
different matched bids and asks, and incorporating a shout
improvement rule that forces offers to beat the last m offers
plus or minus some value δ, and showed that these modifi-
cations created an auction that can achieve high efficiency
and low variation in transaction price even for agents with
zero intelligence.
This new auction type is interesting on its own, as a coun-
terpart to the mechanisms discovered by [1] and [24], but
more interesting, we believe, is that n, m, and δ, along with
Qs from [1] provide a parameter space that can be searched
automatically for additional new kinds of auction that op-
timize performance on metrics other than Ea and α, and
for agents employing other kinds of trading strategies. The
final contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that such
an automated search can discover interesting new types of
auction.
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